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Climate politics: How public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance

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  • Fabien Prieur

    () (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Benteng Zou

Abstract

This paper aims at studying the impact of public persuasion, through information dissemination, on environmental and economic performance. A differential game in which opposite interest groups compete for bringing the majority’s environmental concern closer to their views is developed. The results show a strong asymmetry in the impact of public persuasion. It may bring the median voter economy closer to the social optimum in the long run, thereby reducing environmental and economic distortions. But this only occurs when the environmental group exhibits a radical ideology and people are initially closer to the industrialists’ views. By contrast, economies where industrial groups are powerful and strongly opposed to environmental protection never benefit from the outcome of the game of persuasion. This may explain why the US have failed to take action on global warming up to now.
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  • Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Climate politics: How public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance," Post-Print hal-01899673, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01899673
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01899673
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    1. Zhihao Yu, 2005. "Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 269-286.
    2. Robert Brulle & Jason Carmichael & J. Jenkins, 2012. "Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the U.S., 2002–2010," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 169-188, September.
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    5. Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Steinar Andresen, 2004. "NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 54-75, November.
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    7. Geir Asheim, 2010. "Strategic Use of Environmental Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(2), pages 207-216, June.
    8. David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, March.
    9. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Thomas P. Lyon, 2016. "Merchants of Doubt: Corporate Political Influence when Expert Credibility is Uncertain," Working Papers 2016.28, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
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    11. Wirl, Franz, 1994. "The Dynamics of Lobbying--A Differential Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 307-323, September.
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    13. Georgy Egorov & Bård Harstad, 2017. "Private Politics and Public Regulation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1652-1682.
    14. Prieur, Fabien & Bréchet, Thierry, 2013. "Can Education Be Good For Both Growth And The Environment?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(5), pages 1135-1157, July.
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    16. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mireille Chiroleu‐Assouline & Thomas P. Lyon, 2020. "Merchants of doubt: Corporate political action when NGO credibility is uncertain," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 439-461, April.
    2. Jindapon, Paan & Van Essen, Matt, 2019. "Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 15-23.

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