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Predation enforcement options: an evaluation in a Cournot framework

  • Kai Hüschelrath


  • Jürgen Weigand


The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 241-272

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:35:y:2013:i:2:p:241-272
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  1. Baumol, William J, 1996. "Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 49-72, April.
  2. Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1997. "The Learning Curve, Predation, Antitrust, and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 155-69, June.
  3. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
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