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Partitions and Coalitional Stability with Non-dominant and Dominant Members

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  • Thomas Webster

Abstract

The analysis presented in this paper applies coalitional game theory to an analysis of imperfectly competitive firms producing a homogeneous product. Coalitions consisting of equal partners and no capacity constraints tend to be stable. Grand coalitions consisting of unequal members tend to be unstable. In this case, an intra-coalitional utility transfer may cement the coalition, but the outcome tends to be the same as that in coalitions consisting of equal partners. Coalitions consisting of fewer, unequal members may be possible, however, even in the absence of intra-coalitional utility transfers. Finally, grand coalitions may be possible if subordinate members are capacity constrained. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2009

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Webster, 2009. "Partitions and Coalitional Stability with Non-dominant and Dominant Members," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 37(2), pages 145-157, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:37:y:2009:i:2:p:145-157
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-009-9173-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J., 2003. "Presidential address," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 2-14, October.
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    3. Paul M. Sweezy, 1939. "Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(4), pages 568-568.
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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