Partitions and Coalitional Stability with Non-dominant and Dominant Members
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References listed on IDEAS
- Aumann, Robert J., 2003. "Presidential address," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 2-14, October.
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KeywordsCoalitions; Cooperative games; Imperfect competition; Non-cooperative games; Partitions; C71; C72; D43;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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