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A theory of conscious parallelism

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  • MACLEOD, W.B.

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  • Macleod, W.B., 1984. "A theory of conscious parallelism," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1984040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1984040
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Spence, 1978. "Tacit Co-ordination and Imperfect Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 11(3), pages 490-505, August.
    2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    3. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Profit-sharing in a collusive industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 59-74, June.
    4. Paul M. Sweezy, 1939. "Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(4), pages 568-568.
    5. Green, Edward J., 1980. "Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 155-182, April.
    6. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-372, June.
    7. W. Bentley MacLeod, 1984. "On the Effects of Sunk Costs," Working Paper 555, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    8. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith, 1982. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1123-1142, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2012. "A Theory of Tacit Collusion," Economics Working Paper Archive 588, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    2. Willem Boshoff & Stefan Frübing & Kai Hüschelrath, 2018. "Information exchange through non-binding advance price announcements: an antitrust analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 439-468, June.
    3. Luís Cabral, 2018. "We’re Number 1: Price Wars for Market Share Leadership," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 2013-2030, May.
    4. Juan Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 223-248, November.
    5. Nikolaos Georgantzis & Aurora García Gallego, 2001. "Adaptive Behavior By Single-Product And Multiproduct Price Setting Firms In Experimental Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    6. Baldelli, Serena & Lambertini, Luca, 2006. "Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 121-130, September.
    7. Reimer Jeffrey J, 2004. "Market Conduct in the U.S. Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-29, November.
    8. Silvinha Vasconcelos & Claudio Roberto Fóffano VASCONCELOS, 2007. "Time Series Analysis of Strategic Pricing Behavior in the Brazilian Gasoline Markets: modeling volatility," EcoMod2007 23900088, EcoMod.
    9. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 470-499.
    10. Silvinha P. Vasconcelos & Claudio R. F. Vasconcelos, 2008. "Análise do comportamento estratégico em preços no mercado de gasolina brasileiro: modelando volatilidade," Anais do XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 36th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 200807161313100, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    11. Andrea Lofaro, 1999. "When imperfect collusion is profitable," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 235-259, October.
    12. Erlei Mathias, 2002. "Conscious Parallelism by Fixed Relative Prices / Bewusstes Parallelverhalten durch eine Politik der festen Preisrelation," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 222(2), pages 186-209, April.
    13. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
    14. Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos, 2001. "Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 493-518, March.
    15. Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.

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