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The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Complaints Against Real Estate Agents

Does licensing increase the quality of services? This is a major unresolved question in the economic analysis of occupational licensing. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the simultaneous relationship between anticompetitive effects and minimal quality standards. Using data on real estate agents, we find that restrictions on entry improve the quality of services (by lowering complaints), but, at the same time, there appear to be significant anticompetitive side-effects.

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File URL: http://pages.jh.edu/jrer/papers/pdf/past/vol03n02/v03p001.pdf
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Article provided by American Real Estate Society in its journal Journal of Real Estate Research.

Volume (Year): 3 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1-9

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Handle: RePEc:jre:issued:v:3:n:2:1988:p:1-9
Contact details of provider: Postal: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323
Web page: http://www.aresnet.org/
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Order Information: Postal: Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323
Web: http://pages.jh.edu/jrer/about/get.htm Email:


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  1. Milton Friedman & Simon Kuznets, 1954. "Income from Independent Professional Practice," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number frie54-1, December.
  2. Arlene S. Holen, 1965. "Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Labor Mobility and Resource Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 492.
  3. Bartlett, Randall, 1981. "Property Rights and the Pricing of Real Estate Brokerage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 79-94, September.
  4. Michael Carney, 1982. "Costs and Pricing of Home Brokerage Services," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 10(3), pages 331-354.
  5. Bond, Eric W, 1982. "A Direct Test of the "Lemons" Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 836-40, September.
  6. Chunchi Wu & Peter F. Colwell, 1986. "Equilibrium of Housing and Real Estate Brokerage Markets Under Uncertainty," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-23.
  7. Peter F. Colwell & David W. Marshall, 1986. "Market Share in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 14(4), pages 583-599.
  8. Schwartz, Alan & Wilde, Louis L., . "Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis," Working Papers 235, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  10. Linda L. Johnson & Christine Loucks, 1986. "The Effect of State Licensing Regulations on the Real Estate Brokerage Industry," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 14(4), pages 567-582.
  11. Benham, Lee, 1972. "The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 337-52, October.
  12. Maurizi, Alex, 1974. "Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 399-413, Part I, M.
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