Does work pay in Slovenia?
Income transfers may generate work disincentives: if certain income payments are stopped when individuals (re)enter employment, this creates disincentives for taking employment – so called “unemployment trap”. To make work pay, several countries have introduced policies – financial incentives – which enhance employment opportunities for marginal groups in the labor market. Such policies increase in-work incomes and so improve work incentives for those receiving only out-of-work incomes. This paper tries to shed light on two questions, first being how does “making work pay” work in Slovenia, compared OECD countries, and the second, should Slovenia introduce earnings supplements or other in-work arrangements in tackling possible unemployment trap. According to international comparison Slovenia does not “step-out”, when we look at net replacement rates. Slovenia, however, has not introduced a single active labor programs that would stimulate directly and financially unemployed to join (official) employment, even though a lower paid job. In the paper we suggest the implementation of some kind of in-work arrangement at least for those, who are potentially less stimulated to reemploy.
Volume (Year): 29 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Smiciklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb|
Web page: http://www.fintp.hr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Immervoll, Herwig & O'Donoghue, Cathal, 2003.
"Employment transitions in 13 European countries: levels, distributions and determining factors of net replacement rates,"
EUROMOD Working Papers
EM3/03, EUROMOD at the Institute for Social and Economic Research.
- Herwig Immervoll & Cathal O’Donoghue, 2003. "Employment Transitions in 13 European Countries. Levels, Distributions and Determining Factors of Net Replacement Rates," CESifo Working Paper Series 1091, CESifo Group Munich.
- Giuseppe Carone & Herwig Immervoll & Dominique Paturot & Aino Salomäki, 2004. "Indicators of Unemployment and Low-Wage Traps: Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Employment Incomes," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 18, OECD Publishing.
- Giuseppe Carone & Aino Salomäki & Herwig Immervoll & Dominique Paturot, 2003.
"Indicators of unemployment and low-wage traps (marginal effective tax rates on labour),"
European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015
197, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- Giuseppe Carone & Aino Salomaki & Herwig Immervoll & Dominique Paturot, 2004. "Indicators of unemployment and low-wage traps (Marginal effective tax rates on labour)," Labor and Demography 0409007, EconWPA.
- David Card & Philip K. Robins, 1996. "Do Financial Incentives Encourage Welfare Recipients to Work? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation of the Self-Sufficiency Project," NBER Working Papers 5701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Haveman, 1995. "Reducing Poverty while Increasing Employment: A Primer on Alternative Strategies, and a Blueprint," OECD Jobs Study Working Papers 7, OECD Publishing.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ipf:finteo:v:29:y:2005:i:4:p:341-362. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martina Fabris)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.