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Una Revisión Crítica a la Literatura de Colusión

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  • Ricardo Paredes

Abstract

This paper presents the main conclusions of what in Industrial Organization Theory is known as Collusion Theory. It contains a critique to its methodology and implications and also suggests that this theory is not appropriate for Antitrust Legislation, si

Suggested Citation

  • Ricardo Paredes, 1986. "Una Revisión Crítica a la Literatura de Colusión," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 23(69), pages 173-200.
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:23:y:1986:i:69:p:173-200
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    References listed on IDEAS

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