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Getting Even or Being at Odds? Cohesion in Even- and Odd-Sized Small Groups

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  • Tanya Menon

    (Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637)

  • Katherine W. Phillips

    (Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208)

Abstract

We propose that even-sized small groups often experience lower cohesion than odd-sized small groups. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate this effect within three- to six-person groups of freshman roommates and sibling groups, respectively. Study 3 replicates the basic even/odd effect among three- to five-person groups in a laboratory experiment that examines underlying mechanisms. To account for the even/odd effect, Study 3 focuses on the group's ability to provide members with certainty and identifies majority influence as the key instrument. We argue that groups struggle to provide certainty when they lack majorities (e.g., deadlocked coalitions) or contain unstable majorities (i.e., where small changes in opinion readily overturn existing power arrangements). Member uncertainty mediated the effects of coalition structure on cohesion. The results link structural variables (i.e., even/odd size and coalition structure) to psychological outcomes (i.e., member uncertainty and relational outcomes).

Suggested Citation

  • Tanya Menon & Katherine W. Phillips, 2011. "Getting Even or Being at Odds? Cohesion in Even- and Odd-Sized Small Groups," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(3), pages 738-753, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:22:y:2011:i:3:p:738-753
    DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1100.0535
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Edward Bishop Smith & Yuan Hou, 2015. "Redundant Heterogeneity and Group Performance," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(1), pages 37-51, February.
    2. Ya-Ru Chen & Randall S. Peterson & Damon J. Phillips & Joel M. Podolny & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, 2012. "Introduction to the Special Issue: Bringing Status to the Table—Attaining, Maintaining, and Experiencing Status in Organizations and Markets," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(2), pages 299-307, April.
    3. Qi, Meng & Armstrong, Steven J. & Yang, Zaoli & Li, Xiaoyi, 2022. "Cognitive diversity and team creativity: Effects of demographic faultlines, subgroup imbalance and information elaboration," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 819-830.
    4. Saskia Crucke & Mirjam Knockaert, 2016. "When Stakeholder Representation Leads to Faultlines. A Study of Board Service Performance in Social Enterprises," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 768-793, July.
    5. Arjun Chakravarti & Tanya Menon & Christopher Winship, 2014. "Contact and Group Structure: A Natural Experiment of Interracial College Roommate Groups," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(4), pages 1216-1233, August.
    6. Martin, Ashley E. & Phillips, Katherine W., 2017. "What “blindness” to gender differences helps women see and do: Implications for confidence, agency, and action in male-dominated environments," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 28-44.
    7. Gottschalck, Nicole & Rolan, Lisa & Kellermanns, Franz W., 2023. "The continuance commitment of family firm CEOs," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4).
    8. Tsutomu Harada, 2021. "Three heads are better than two: Comparing learning properties and performances across individuals, dyads, and triads through a computational approach," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(6), pages 1-16, June.

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