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Incentivized Actions in Freemium Games

Author

Listed:
  • Lifei Sheng

    (College of Business, University of Houston-Clear Lake, Houston, Texas 77058)

  • Christopher Thomas Ryan

    (Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada)

  • Mahesh Nagarajan

    (Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada)

  • Yuan Cheng

    (School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)

  • Chunyang Tong

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

Problem definition : Games are the fastest-growing sector of the entertainment industry. Freemium games are the fastest-growing segment within games. The concept behind freemium is to attract large pools of players, many of whom will never spend money on the game. When game publishers cannot earn directly from the pockets of consumers, they employ other revenue-generating content, such as advertising. Players can become irritated by revenue-generating content. A recent innovation is to offer incentives for players to interact with such content, such as clicking an ad or watching a video. These are termed incentivized (incented) actions. We study the optimal deployment of incented actions. Academic/practical relevance : Removing or adding incented actions can essentially be done in real-time. Accordingly, the deployment of incented actions is a tactical, operational question for game designers. Methodology : We model the deployment problem as a Markov decision process (MDP). We study the performance of simple policies, as well as the structure of optimal policies. We use a proprietary data set to calibrate our MDP and derive insights. Results : Cannibalization—the degree to which incented actions distract players from making in-app purchases—is the key parameter for determining how to deploy incented actions. If cannibalization is sufficiently high, it is never optimal to offer incented actions. If cannibalization is sufficiently low, it is always optimal to offer. We find sufficient conditions for the optimality of threshold strategies that offer incented actions to low-engagement users and later remove them once a player is sufficiently engaged. Managerial implications : This research introduces operations management academics to a new class of operational issues in the games industry. Managers in the games industry can gain insights into when incentivized actions can be more or less effective. Game designers can use our MDP model to make data-driven decisions for deploying incented actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lifei Sheng & Christopher Thomas Ryan & Mahesh Nagarajan & Yuan Cheng & Chunyang Tong, 2022. "Incentivized Actions in Freemium Games," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 275-284, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:24:y:2022:i:1:p:275-284
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.2020.0923
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marius F. Niculescu & D. J. Wu, 2014. "Economics of Free Under Perpetual Licensing: Implications for the Software Industry," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 173-199, March.
    2. Hsing Kenneth Cheng & Shengli Li & Yipeng Liu, 2015. "Optimal Software Free Trial Strategy: Limited Version, Time-locked, or Hybrid?," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(3), pages 504-517, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Simeng Liu & Yashuang Wei & Guofang Nan & Dahui Li, 2026. "Pay-to-play versus hybrid bundling for digital game platforms in digital decarbonization era," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 359(2), pages 2115-2148, April.
    2. Qiao, Lingyu & Tang, Wansheng & Hao, Guangwei & Xia, Yi & Zhang, Jianxiong, 2025. "When and how to introduce live streaming for video game? Consumers’ trade-off between buying and watching," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    3. Yanni Ping & Yang Li & Jiaxin Zhu, 2025. "Beyond accuracy measures: the effect of diversity, novelty and serendipity in recommender systems on user engagement," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 2177-2204, June.
    4. Lifei Sheng & Xuying Zhao & Christopher Thomas Ryan, 2025. "Selling Bonus Actions in Video Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(3), pages 2544-2564, March.
    5. Jiaying Deng & Stephanie Lee & Yong Tan, 2025. "Flow of the Game: A Hidden Markov Model of Player Engagement in Online Mobile Games," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 1898-1911, September.
    6. Abhishek Deshmane & Xabier Barriola, 2025. "Frame by Fame: Content Creation on Short Video-Format Platforms," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 27(2), pages 479-495, March.
    7. Yifu Li & Christopher Thomas Ryan & Lifei Sheng, 2023. "Optimal Sequencing in Single-Player Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(10), pages 6057-6075, October.

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