Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- George Hendrikse & Li Feng, 2013. "Interfirm cooperatives," Chapters,in: Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 26 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Deng, W. & Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2012. "Uncertainties And Governance Structure In Incentives Provision For Product Quality," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2012-016-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Deng, Wendong & Hendrikse, George, 2014. "Social capital and incentives in the provision of product quality by cooperatives," 2014 International Congress, August 26-29, 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia 182687, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Ewert, Joachim & Hanf, Jon H. & Schweichert, Erik, 2014. "Adaptation of South African Wine Cooperatives to Challenging Business Environments," Journal of Rural Cooperation, Hebrew University, Center for Agricultural Economic Research, vol. 42(2).
- Liang, Qiao & Hendrikse, George, 2016. "Pooling and the yardstick effect of cooperatives," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 97-105.
More about this item
Keywordschannel governance; cooperatives; pooling; foreclosure; market power; incomplete contracts;
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