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Managing Channel Profits

Author

Listed:
  • Abel P. Jeuland

    (Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637)

  • Steven M. Shugan

    (Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611)

Abstract

A channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables. However, each channel member's decisions do affect the other channel members' profits and, as a consequence, actions. A lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences. For example, in the simple manufacturer-retailer-consumer channel, uncoordinated and independent channel members' decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated. In addition, the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer. This paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination. We address the following questions. —What is the effect of channel coordination? —What causes a lack of coordination in the channel? —How difficult is it to achieve channel coordination? —What mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination? —What are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism? —What is the role of nonprice variables (e.g., manufacturer advertising, retailer shelf-space) in coordination? —Does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in-store experimentation? —Can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism? —Are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts? We review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem. We then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits. This article was originally published in , Volume 2, Issue 3, pages 239–272, in 1983.

Suggested Citation

  • Abel P. Jeuland & Steven M. Shugan, 2008. "Managing Channel Profits," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 52-69, 01-02.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:27:y:2008:i:1:p:52-69
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0332
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Watson, George F. & Worm, Stefan & Palmatier, Robert W. & Ganesan, Shankar, 2015. "The Evolution of Marketing Channels: Trends and Research Directions," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 91(4), pages 546-568.
    3. Hamed Jafari & Seyed Reza Hejazi & Morteza Rasti-Barzoki, 2016. "Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 323-343, September.
    4. Ahmed Timoumi & Narendra Singh & Subodha Kumar, 2021. "Is Your Retailer a Friend or Foe: When Should the Manufacturer Allow Its Retailer to Refurbish?," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(9), pages 2814-2839, September.
    5. Yenipazarli, Arda, 2017. "To collaborate or not to collaborate: Prompting upstream eco-efficient innovation in a supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(2), pages 571-587.
    6. Lu Hsiao & Ying‐Ju Chen & Hui Xiong, 2019. "Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(3), pages 213-229, April.
    7. Abhishek Srivastava & Abhishek Chakraborty & Arqum Mateen, 2022. "Role of power imbalance on channel coordination under greening investments," OPSEARCH, Springer;Operational Research Society of India, vol. 59(4), pages 1522-1554, December.
    8. de Matta, Renato & Lowe, Timothy J. & Zhang, Dengfeng, 2017. "Competition in the multi-sided platform market channel," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 40-51.
    9. Davoudi, Zahra & Seifbarghy, Mehdi & Sarkar, Mitali & Sarkar, Biswajit, 2023. "Effect of bargaining on pricing and retailing under a green supply chain management," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    10. Xiong, Yu & Yan, Wei & Fernandes, Kiran & Xiong, Zhong-Kai & Guo, Nian, 2012. "“Bricks vs. Clicks”: The impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable goods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 217(1), pages 75-83.

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