The Impacts of Internet Monitoring on Employees’ Cyberloafing and Organizational Citizenship Behavior: A Longitudinal Field Quasi-Experiment
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DOI: 10.1287/isre.2020.0216
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Keywords
internet monitoring; cyberloafing; organizational citizenship behavior; deterrence theory; field experiment;All these keywords.
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