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¿Cómo valora el mercado de valores español la adopción de planes de opciones sobre acciones para directivos y consejeros?

  • Mónica Melle

    (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

Registered author(s):

    Este artículo analiza las reacciones del mercado de capitales español ante la adopción de planes de opciones sobre acciones para directivos y consejeros entre el 1 de septiembre de 1998 y el 31 de julio de 2003, bajo las hipótesis semifuerte de eficiencia del mercado y del contenido informativo de estos sistemas retributivos. El mercado valora favorablemente la formalización de los acuerdos y su comunicación oficial; el precio de ejercicio y los periodos de carencia y de ejercicio de las opciones determinan las rentabilidades anormales positivas. A medio plazo, existe una relación negativa entre la adopción de estos planes y los retornos de los títulos.

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    Article provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Economicas.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 73-115

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    Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:29:y:2005:i:1:p:73-115
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