La colaboración empresarial desde la teoría de los derechos de propiedad
This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs agurments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimensions of going from "contracts" to "hierarchies" has been ignored in the past and with it the so called "costs of ownership". The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which Spanish firms participate, indicate that the cost of ownership may o set the benefits of hierarchial controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)
Volume (Year): 26 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971.
"Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
- Balakrishnan, Srinivasan & Koza, Mitchell P., 1993. "Information asymmetry, adverse selection and joint-ventures : Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 99-117, January.
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