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Corporate Governance, Media Coverage, and Corporate Environmental Protection Investment: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China’s High-Pollution Industries

Author

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  • Yuan Wang

    (School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China
    School of Management, Xi’an University of Science &Technology, Xi’an 710054, China)

  • Junrui Zhang

    (School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China
    Department of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University City College, Xi’an 710018, China)

Abstract

In this study, regarding listed companies of high-pollution industries in China’s A share as the research object and media coverage as the moderator variable, corporate governance data from 2015 to 2019 were selected. Studied the impact of corporate governance and media coverage on corporate environmental protection investment. Corporate governance was divided into four dimensions: shareholding structure, characteristics of the independent directors, characteristics of the board of supervisors, and management characteristics. A multiple regression model and monitoring model were constructed to study the influencing factors of the environmental protection investment behavior of enterprises, and the relationship between relevant variables was empirically tested. The results show the following: (1) The equity structure is expressed by the degree of separation of cash flow rights and shareholders’ control rights. There is a significant negative correlation between shareholding structure and enterprise environmental protection investment. The characteristics of the board of supervisors and management are measured by executive compensation. The characteristics of the board of supervisors have a significant positive impact on an enterprise’s environmental protection investment. Management characteristics have a significant positive impact on enterprise environmental protection investment. (2) Media coverage as a moderator variable is measured by the data reported by important Chinese newspapers. In the robustness test, media coverage is measured by the number of Chinese financial newspaper reports and the number of online media reports. Media coverage positively regulates the relationships among the ownership structure, the characteristics of the board of supervisors, management characteristics, and enterprise environmental protection investment. (3) Positive media reports have a more significant moderating effect than negative media reports.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuan Wang & Junrui Zhang, 2023. "Corporate Governance, Media Coverage, and Corporate Environmental Protection Investment: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China’s High-Pollution Industries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-24, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:11:p:8643-:d:1156485
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    References listed on IDEAS

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