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Structure de propriété et sous-performance des firmes: une étude empirique sur le marché au comptant, le règlement mensuel et le second marché

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  • Rajaa Mtanios
  • Mathieu Paquerot

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

This research is focused on the study of the influence of ownership structure on the underperformance of firms in the Paris Stock Exchange. Agency theory assumes that ownership structure of a firm influences its performance and this through two of its components:the capital concentration and the nature of the stakeholders. The results are significant for the variables of the study between the different parts of the capital market but do not allow us to confirm the agency theory hypothesis

Suggested Citation

  • Rajaa Mtanios & Mathieu Paquerot, 1999. "Structure de propriété et sous-performance des firmes: une étude empirique sur le marché au comptant, le règlement mensuel et le second marché," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(4), pages 157-179, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:2:y:1999:i:q4:p:157-179
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Sylvain Marsat & Yves Mard & Fabien Roux, 2014. "Ownership structure and corporate financial performance: evidence from France [Structure de l’actionnariat et performance financière de l’entreprise : le cas français]," Post-Print hal-02156607, HAL.

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