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Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation

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  • Xueping Wu

    (School of Economics and Trade, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, China)

  • Liping Zhang

    (School of Economics and Trade, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, China)

  • Jianhua Huang

    (School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, China)

  • Wei Li

    (School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, China)

  • Yanhua Chen

    (School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, China)

  • Wenhai Qiu

    (School of Information Engineering, Fujian Business University, Fuzhou 350012, China)

Abstract

Municipal household waste (MHW) separation is a fundamental way to achieve waste reduction and a recycling economy. This study takes the positions of government and residents in MHW separation as the research object, and aims to explore the change process and influencing factors of their decision-making behavior, which is of great significance to attract residents to participate in MHW separation and establish an effective MHW separation mechanism to solve MHW pollution. This paper firstly establishes an evolutionary game model between government and residents in MHW separation; secondly, the payoff matrix of the system is determined, and the replication dynamic equations under different constraints are calculated to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the system, and the stability conditions are analyzed; Finally, through numerical simulation, the decision-making behavior of MHW separation and its influencing factors are studied, and the rationality of the model is verified. The results show that: (1) In the process of MHW separation, residents often choose not to separate without government regulation; (2) Environmental fee rates and government effort have great impacts on residents’ decision-making behavior; (3) The increase of penalty intensity can significantly drive residents to separate MHW; (4) The sensitivity of residents’ behavior decision to subsidy coefficient is the lowest among all the variables, and the incentive effect of increasing subsidy coefficient is not obvious. The research results can not only provide theoretical guidance for policy makers to develop waste management policies, but also provide valuable insights for local communities to guide residents’ MHW separation behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Xueping Wu & Liping Zhang & Jianhua Huang & Wei Li & Yanhua Chen & Wenhai Qiu, 2021. "Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-19, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:20:p:11421-:d:657539
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    Cited by:

    1. Lichi Zhang & Yanyan Jiang & Junmin Wu, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Residents’ Participation in Waste Separation Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(21), pages 1-16, November.
    2. Li, Ye & Yang, Tianjian & Zhang, Yu, 2022. "Evolutionary game theory-based system dynamics modeling for community solid waste classification in China," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Decai Tang & Lei Shi & Xiaojuan Huang & Ziqian Zhao & Biao Zhou & Brandon J. Bethel, 2022. "Influencing Factors on the Household-Waste-Classification Behavior of Urban Residents: A Case Study in Shanghai," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(11), pages 1-16, May.
    4. Yingxia Xue & Fang Liu & Guangbin Wang & Jungang Shao, 2023. "Research on Strategy Evolution of Contractor and Resident in Construction Stage of Old Community Renovation Project," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-20, January.

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