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Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of New-Energy Vehicle Promotion in China Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Rongjiang Cai

    (School of Economics and Management, Ningbo University of Technology, Ningbo 315211, China
    Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China)

  • Tao Zhang

    (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China)

  • Xi Wang

    (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China)

  • Qiaoran Jia

    (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China)

  • Shufang Zhao

    (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China)

  • Nana Liu

    (School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167, China)

  • Xiaoguang Wang

    (School of Mathematics and Information Engineering, Lianyungang Normal College, Lianyungang 222000, China)

Abstract

In China, new-energy vehicles are viewed as the ultimate goal for the automobile industry, given the current focus on the “dual-carbon” target. Therefore, it is important to promote the sustainable development of this new-energy market and ensure a smooth transition from fuel-driven vehicles to new-energy vehicles. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving vehicle enterprises, consumers, and the government. It improves the tripartite evolutionary game through the mechanisms of dynamic and static rewards and punishments, respectively, using real-world data. The results show the following. (1) A fluctuation is present in the sales of new-energy vehicles by enterprises and the active promotional behavior of the government. This fluctuation leads to instability, and the behavior is difficult to accurately predict, which is not conducive new-energy vehicles’ promotion and sales. (2) A static reward and punishment mechanism can change the fluctuation threshold or peak value. Nevertheless, the stability of the system’s strategy is not the main reason that the government has been actively promoting it for a long time. However, enterprises are still wavering between new-energy and fuel vehicles. (3) The linear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism also has its defects. Although they are considered the stability control strategy of the system, they are still not conducive to stability. (4) The nonlinear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can help the system to achieve the ideal stabilization strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Rongjiang Cai & Tao Zhang & Xi Wang & Qiaoran Jia & Shufang Zhao & Nana Liu & Xiaoguang Wang, 2024. "Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of New-Energy Vehicle Promotion in China Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(18), pages 1-24, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:18:p:2900-:d:1479917
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