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Effects of multiple incentive policies on carbon information disclosure strategies of power battery: A complex network evolutionary game analysis

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  • Zhu, Lu
  • He, Juan

Abstract

Power batteries are considered a key of electrification and low-carbon development in the transportation industry. Carbon information disclosure, as an environmental regulatory tool, plays a significant role in promoting carbon reduction efforts among power battery firms. While Chinese provinces and cities have introduced multiple policies to incentivize carbon information disclosure, existing research has paid limited attention to the impact of such incentive policies on power battery carbon information disclosure, particularly the effects of combined policy incentives. Therefore, this paper constructs a three-layer analytical framework integrating complex network topology association, evolutionary game strategy interaction, and policy combination scenario analysis to explore the effects of various subsidy policies (eg., carbon reduction subsidies) and financial policies (eg., disclosure support loans) and their combinations on carbon information disclosure by power battery firms. The study shows that both subsidy policies and financial policies can promote positive disclosure of carbon information for power batteries. However, financial policies alone have limited effects in promoting carbon information disclosure by power battery firms, and moderate subsidy policies are necessary. Policy combinations exhibit synergistic effects under certain conditions. Although pure subsidy-based combinations can effectively promote disclosure, they may increase the fiscal burden. It is advisable to transition gradually from pure subsidy-based combinations to “subsidy + financial” policy combinations. The three-layer analytical framework established in this study provides a reference for policymakers in making actual decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhu, Lu & He, Juan, 2026. "Effects of multiple incentive policies on carbon information disclosure strategies of power battery: A complex network evolutionary game analysis," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 292(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:292:y:2026:i:c:s0925527326000101
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109919
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