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Disallowances and overcapitalization in the U.S. electric utility industry

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  • Stratford Douglas
  • Thomas A. Garrett
  • Russell M. Rhine

Abstract

Regulation of an industry often produces unintended consequences. Averch and Johnson (1962) argue that certain regulation of electric utilities provides utilities the incentive to purchase an inefficiently large amount of capital. Another possible and related unintended consequence of electric utility regulation is that regulatory cost disallowances on capital may also increase utilities' incentives to overcapitalize. The authors provide theoretical evidence that capital expenditure disallowances will increase the Averch and Johnson effect in some instances and thus may have contributed to the overcapitalization problem that regulation was designed to discourage. Our model shows that disallowances can reduce the rate of return on investment and thereby increase the Averch and Johnson distortion.

Suggested Citation

  • Stratford Douglas & Thomas A. Garrett & Russell M. Rhine, 2009. "Disallowances and overcapitalization in the U.S. electric utility industry," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 91(Jan), pages 23-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2009:i:jan:p:23-32:n:v.91no.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Thomas P. Lyon, 1991. "Regulation with 20-20 Hindsight: "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose"?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 581-595, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simshauser, Paul & Akimov, Alexandr, 2019. "Regulated electricity networks, investment mistakes in retrospect and stranded assets under uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 117-133.
    2. Simshauser, Paul, 2017. "Monopoly regulation, discontinuity & stranded assets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 384-398.
    3. Russell Rhine, 2001. "Economies of scale and optimal capital in nuclear and fossil fuel electricity production," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(2), pages 203-214, June.
    4. Knittel, Christopher R. & Metaxoglou, Konstantinos & Trindade, André, 2019. "Environmental implications of market structure: Shale gas and electricity markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 511-550.

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