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Partial Cooperation and Non-Signatories Multiple Decision

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    In this paper we investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players and the rest of the players who do not cooperate and play a Nash game having multiple equilibria. Some properties of the partial cooperative equilibrium are studied and applied to a public goods situation.

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    Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 021-027

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    Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2008_021
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    1. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, June.
    2. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    3. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:3:p:441-63 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    5. Corchon, Luis C., 1994. "Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 151-165, December.
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