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Traffic safety: Speed limits, strict liability and a km tax

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  • Delhaye, E.

Abstract

This paper focuses on two specific determinants of accidents: speed and the activity level. If there is no government intervention, people do not take into account the full cost of their driving and they will drive too fast and too much. In our setting, the government can use three instruments to influence the behaviour of people: speed limits, strict liability and a kilometre tax. We analyse the choice of the speed and activity level under the different instruments and determine the optimal combinations. Given our assumptions we never reach the social optimum. The results are illustrated with a numerical example.

Suggested Citation

  • Delhaye, E., 2006. "Traffic safety: Speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 205-226, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transa:v:40:y:2006:i:3:p:205-226
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eef Delhaye, 2004. "Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0407, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    2. Peirson, John & Skinner, Ian & Vickerman, Roger, 1998. "The Microeconomic Analysis of the External Costs of Road Accidents," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 429-440, August.
    3. Keller, Wouter J., 1976. "A nested CES-type utility function and its demand and price-index functions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 175-186, February.
    4. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    5. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lu, Qing-Long & Qurashi, Moeid & Antoniou, Constantinos, 2023. "Simulation-based policy analysis: The case of urban speed limits," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    2. Albalate, Daniel & Bel, Germà, 2012. "Speed limit laws in America: The role of geography, mobility and ideology," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 337-347.
    3. Tscharaktschiew, Stefan, 2020. "Why are highway speed limits really justified? An equilibrium speed choice analysis," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 317-351.

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