IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/telpol/v49y2025i3s0308596125000126.html

Economic, political, and social factors impeding the regulation of digital platforms

Author

Listed:
  • Garcia-Murillo, Martha
  • MacInnes, Ian

Abstract

This paper analyzes the economic forces that led to the creation of the dominant digital platforms, including Google, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and Apple (GAMMA). There are many challenges in regulating big tech, considering the economic, political, and social factors involved. In the economic sphere, the reinforcing effects of networks and big data give GAMMA an advantage over new entrants and smaller players. They generate insights about consumers and innovate more easily due to collecting and analyzing vast amounts of information. They have a great advantage due to their size and have been sued for abuse of their power. In terms of politics, speech online has polarized US society, but it is difficult to regulate despite the harassment, bullying, and vigilantism that is fostered and the children that it has harmed. Numerous factors hinder regulation, so alternative methods will be necessary to minimize their negative impacts on society. These can include education and professional associations to establish standards. Non-government stakeholders will need to develop information, tools, and guidelines that can limit the harm done by these dominant platforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Garcia-Murillo, Martha & MacInnes, Ian, 2025. "Economic, political, and social factors impeding the regulation of digital platforms," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(3).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:49:y:2025:i:3:s0308596125000126
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2025.102915
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596125000126
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.telpol.2025.102915?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Luca Braghieri & Ro'ee Levy & Alexey Makarin, 2022. "Social Media and Mental Health," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(11), pages 3660-3693, November.
    3. Murat Somer & Jennifer McCoy, 2019. "Transformations through Polarizations and Global Threats to Democracy," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 681(1), pages 8-22, January.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, June.
    5. Tisha L. N. Emerson & Gail M. Hoyt, 2024. "Teaching-Track Faculty at US National Universities," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 114, pages 314-317, May.
    6. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    7. Gregory J. Martin & Ali Yurukoglu, 2017. "Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2565-2599, September.
    8. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    9. Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick & Martin Minogue & David Parker, 2004. "Competition, regulation and regulatory governance: an overview," Chapters, in: Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick & Martin Minogue & David Parker (ed.), Leading Issues in Competition, Regulation and Development, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Gawer, Annabelle, 2014. "Bridging differing perspectives on technological platforms: Toward an integrative framework," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1239-1249.
    11. Christopher D. Johnston & Gabriel J. Madson, 2022. "Negativity bias, personality and political ideology," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 6(5), pages 666-676, May.
    12. Feng Zhu & Qihong Liu, 2018. "Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(10), pages 2618-2642, October.
    13. John V. Duca & Jason L. Saving, 2017. "Income Inequality, Media Fragmentation, And Increased Political Polarization," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 392-413, April.
    14. James N. Druckman & Samara Klar & Yanna Krupnikov & Matthew Levendusky & John Barry Ryan, 2021. "Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 5(1), pages 28-38, January.
    15. Susan Ariel Aaronson, 2017. "What Are We Talking About When We Discuss Digital Protectionism?," Working Papers 2017-9, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    16. ., 2024. "Introduction to Teaching International Law," Chapters, in: Teaching International Law, chapter 1, pages 1-23, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Daniel Trottier, 2020. "Denunciation and doxing: towards a conceptual model of digital vigilantism," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3-4), pages 196-212, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fernandes, Diana Vieira & Silva, Carlos Santos, 2022. "Open Energy Data — A regulatory framework proposal under the Portuguese electric system context," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    2. Schmidt, Dominik & Stöckl, Thomas & Palan, Stefan, 2024. "Voting for insider trading regulation. An experimental study of informed and uninformed traders’ preferences," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    3. Cenamor, Javier, 2021. "Complementor competitive advantage: A framework for strategic decisions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 335-343.
    4. Chong, Beng-Soon & Liu, Ming-Hua & Altunbas, Yener, 1996. "The impact of universal banking on the risks and returns of Japanese financial institutions," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 4(2-3), pages 181-195, July.
    5. Anna Dimitrova, 2021. "Captured Energy Market Operation and Liberalization Efforts," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 7, pages 19-31.
    6. Harold Mulherin, J., 2007. "Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 421-437, June.
    7. Kothari, S. P., 2001. "Capital markets research in accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 105-231, September.
    8. Cornett, Marcia Millon & Davidson, Wallace III & Rangan, Nanda, 1996. "Deregulation in investment banking: Industry concentration following Rule 415," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 85-113, January.
    9. Simshauser, Paul & Akimov, Alexandr, 2019. "Regulated electricity networks, investment mistakes in retrospect and stranded assets under uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 117-133.
    10. Alejandro Castaneda, 2020. "Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico," Tiempo y Economía, Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, vol. 7(2), pages 90-118.
    11. Inoue, Yuki, 2021. "Indirect innovation management by platform ecosystem governance and positioning: Toward collective ambidexterity in the ecosystems," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    12. Dolar, Burak & Shughart II, William F., 2011. "Enforcement of the USA Patriot Act's anti-money laundering provisions: Have regulators followed a risk-based approach?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 19-31.
    13. Connelly, J. Thomas & Limpaphayom, Piman & Nguyen, Hien T. & Tran, Thanh D., 2017. "A tale of two cities: Economic development, corporate governance and firm value in Vietnam," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 102-123.
    14. Garcia-Murillo, Martha & MacInnes, Ian, 2024. "Mapping our Digital Dilemmas: Assessing Harms and the Viability of Legislation and Regulation in the United States," 24th ITS Biennial Conference, Seoul 2024. New bottles for new wine: digital transformation demands new policies and strategies 302468, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    15. Shi, Xianwei & Liang, Xingkun & Luo, Yining, 2023. "Unpacking the intellectual structure of ecosystem research in innovation studies," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(6).
    16. Amoako-Adu, Ben & Smith, Brian F., 1995. "The wealth effects of deregulation of Canadian financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(7), pages 1211-1236, October.
    17. Andreas Hein & Maximilian Schreieck & Tobias Riasanow & David Soto Setzke & Manuel Wiesche & Markus Böhm & Helmut Krcmar, 2020. "Digital platform ecosystems," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 30(1), pages 87-98, March.
    18. Petar Stankov, 2017. "Economic Freedom and Welfare Before and After the Crisis," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-319-62497-6, October.
    19. Liu, He & Li, Xuerong & Wang, Shouyang, 2021. "A bibliometric analysis of 30 years of platform research: Developing the research agenda for platforms, the associated technologies and social impacts," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    20. Lee, Sungdo & Seo, Yongseok, 2022. "Exploring how interest groups affect regulation and innovation based on the two-level games: The case of regulatory sandboxes in Korea," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:49:y:2025:i:3:s0308596125000126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30471/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.