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“Laboratory nationalism”: Policy innovation in China

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  • Qian, Jinbao
  • Li, Linmu

Abstract

The central government and local governments in China constitute “laboratory nationalism”, which is different from “laboratory federalism”. As a planner, the central government first organizes small-scale policy trials, then imitates the successful policies on a larger scale. To illustrate the process, we take the gradual regional opening as a typical case, then develop a two-stage “trial-extension” game model incorporating the central government and two local governments. Laboratory nationalism's domination depends on actions of the central government at two stages: (1) offering proper incentives to the eligible district at the beginning; (2) in the end unifying local policies to the one which has proven to be successful. We demonstrate that under certain conditions, laboratory nationalism can improve on decentralized outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Qian, Jinbao & Li, Linmu, 2024. "“Laboratory nationalism”: Policy innovation in China," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceps:v:92:y:2024:i:c:s0038012124000521
    DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2024.101853
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Laboratory nationalism; Policy innovation; Two-stage game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
    • O35 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Social Innovation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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