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The effects of compensation plans for employee inventions on R&D productivity: New evidence from Japanese panel data

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  • Onishi, Koichiro

Abstract

This article reports the first results on how monetary compensation plans for employee inventions affect R&D productivity, based on the notable panel data of Japanese firms. The study finds that the introduction of revenue-based compensation plans that are linked to patent performance lead to an increase in the number of high cited patents, while this never leads to an increase in the number of patent applications. Furthermore, this is strongly effective in smaller firms. These results indicate that the monetary incentives based on patent performance are effective on enhancing the motivation of employee inventors.

Suggested Citation

  • Onishi, Koichiro, 2013. "The effects of compensation plans for employee inventions on R&D productivity: New evidence from Japanese panel data," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 367-378.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:367-378 DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2012.09.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ers:journl:v:xx:y:2017:i:3a:p:82-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Masatoshi Kato & Koichiro Onishi & Yuji Honjo, 2017. "Does patenting always help new-firm survival?," Discussion Paper Series 159, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2017.
    3. repec:eee:tefoso:v:122:y:2017:i:c:p:49-62 is not listed on IDEAS

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