Incentivizing managers to build innovative firms
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- Linus Wilson, 2014. "Managerial ownership with rent-seeking employees," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 375-394, August.
- Jean Canil & Bruce Rosser, 2015. "Evidence on exercise pricing in CEO option grants in two countries," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 383-410, November.
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KeywordsPatents; Executive compensation; Pay-for-performance sensitivity; G32; G30; L2; O3;
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
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