IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

What is the best way to impede a central bank?

  • VanderHart, Peter G.
Registered author(s):

    Recent work has found several ways of restricting central bank behavior to achieve much of the gain of commitment over discretion. This paper compares three such impediments: A quadratic penalty on interest rate changes, a fixed penalty on any rate change, and forced infrequency of rate change. All three achieve significant improvement over discretion, and often come close to interest rate rule commitment. The fixed penalty is frequently the best performing restriction, although the quadratic penalty does best in certain alternative parameterizations. Combinations are found to provide no improvement over the individual impediments alone.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5X-4TPF4NN-1/2/92bd93d936c989a350fb5f9112d0912e
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.

    Volume (Year): 49 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 3 (August)
    Pages: 784-797

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:49:y:2009:i:3:p:784-797
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620167

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Klaus Adam & Roberto M. Billi, 2005. "Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Research Working Paper RWP 05-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    2. Thomas Lubik & Frank Schorfheide, 2002. "Testing for Indeterminacy:An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy," Economics Working Paper Archive 480, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003.
    3. Peter N. Ireland, 2002. "Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 536, Boston College Department of Economics.
    4. Rudebusch, G.D. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting," Papers 637, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    5. Rudd, Jeremy & Whelan, Karl, 2005. "New tests of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(6), pages 1167-1181, September.
    6. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
    7. Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "Inflation dynamics: A structural econometric analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 195-222, October.
    8. Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler & David López-Salido, 2005. "Robustness of the Estimates of the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0520, Banco de Espa�a.
    9. repec:dgr:kubcen:199971 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Monetary Policy Committees and Interest Rate Smoothing," CEP Discussion Papers dp0780, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    11. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Schaling, Eric & Verhagen, Willem, 1999. "A Theory of Interest Rate Stepping: Inflation Targeting in a Dynamic Menu Cost Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 2168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    13. Woodford Michael, 2002. "Inflation Stabilization and Welfare," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-53, February.
    14. Clarida, R. & Gali, J. & Gertler, M., 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Working Papers 99-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    15. Glenn D. Rudebusch, 2006. "Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(4), December.
    16. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    17. Favero, Carlo A & Rovelli, Riccardo, 2003. " Macroeconomic Stability and the Preferences of the Fed: A Formal Analysis, 1961-98," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 545-56, August.
    18. Carl E. Walsh, 2003. "Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232316, June.
    19. John B. Taylor, 1999. "A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 319-348 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Argia M. Sbordone, 2005. "Do expected future marginal costs drive inflation dynamics?," Staff Reports 204, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    21. Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 861-886.
    22. Richard Dennis, 2001. "The policy preferences of the U.S. Federal Reserve," Working Paper Series 2001-08, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    23. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
    24. Tokhir Mirzoev, 2004. "Limited Commitment, Inaction and Optimal Monetary Policy," Macroeconomics 0409027, EconWPA.
    25. Fischer, Stanley, 1990. "Rules versus discretion in monetary policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 1155-1184 Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:49:y:2009:i:3:p:784-797. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.