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The demand for protection and the persistently high rates of gun violence among young black males

Author

Listed:
  • Evans, William N.
  • Kotowski, Maciej H.

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model to explain the persistently high level of gun violence for black males ages 15–24 consistent with the empirical literature. A person may carry a gun for instrumental (i.e., criminal) reasons or for its perceived protective benefit. Discerning underlying motives is difficult. A shock to the instrumental benefit can move the equilibrium to one with a high gun prevalence. The model demonstrates that there are larger returns to reducing the value of guns for crime than trying to reduce their protective benefit, suggesting different policy paths to combat the problem of gun violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Evans, William N. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2024. "The demand for protection and the persistently high rates of gun violence among young black males," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:234:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724000501
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105114
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tipping point; Coordination failure; Gun violence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General

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