The labour market on the hypercube
Positions offered on a labour market and workers preferences are described here by bit strings representing individual traits. We study the co-evolution of workers and firms preferences modeled by such traits. Individual “size-like” properties are controlled by binary encounters whose outcomes depend upon a recognition process. Depending upon the parameter set-up, mutual selection of workers and positions results in different types of attractors, either an exclusive niches regime or a competition regime.
Volume (Year): 387 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877.
- Challet, Damien & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 1998. "On the minority game: Analytical and numerical studies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 514-532.
- Tanya Araujo & R. Vilela Mendes, 2006. "Market-oriented innovation: When is it profitable? An abstract agent-based study," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/31, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
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