Changes in Malaysia: Capital controls, prime ministers and political connections
During the 1997 Asian currency crisis and resulting imposition of capital controls in Malaysia, evidence from previous studies shows that firms with political connections suffered more during the crisis but benefited more when capital controls were introduced. In the period since then, the evidence shows financial firms with political connections have not performed as well as others since the measures set up to support them have been removed. The study period not only includes the relaxation of capital controls, but also the resignation of Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohammad as prime minister and the handover of control to Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.
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