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Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions

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  • Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo
  • del Campo-Hitschfeld, Maria Luisa
  • Mora-Melià, Daniel
  • Domínguez, David

Abstract

Currently, multi-attribute auctions are becoming widespread awarding mechanisms for contracts in construction, and in these auctions, criteria other than price are taken into account for ranking bidder proposals. Therefore, being the lowest-price bidder is no longer a guarantee of being awarded, thus increasing the importance of measuring any bidder’s performance when not only the first position (lowest price) matters.

Suggested Citation

  • Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo & del Campo-Hitschfeld, Maria Luisa & Mora-Melià, Daniel & Domínguez, David, 2015. "Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 2(C), pages 24-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:oprepe:v:2:y:2015:i:c:p:24-35
    DOI: 10.1016/j.orp.2015.02.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schiereck, D. & Vogt, J., 2013. "Long-Run M&A Success of Strategic Bidders in the Construction Industry," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 70391, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
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    5. Martin Skitmore, 2004. "Predicting the probability of winning sealed bid auctions: the effects of outliers on bidding models," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 101-109.
    6. Lawrence Friedman, 1956. "A Competitive-Bidding Strategy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(1), pages 104-112, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lan, Jibin & Chen, Yuwen & Ning, Mengyao & Wang, Zhongxing, 2015. "A new linguistic aggregation operator and its application to multiple attribute decision making," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 2(C), pages 156-164.
    2. Fuqiang Lu & Yanli Hu & Hualing Bi & Min Huang & Meng Zhao, 2018. "An Auction Approach for Cost and Schedule Management of IT Outsourcing Project," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 35(05), pages 1-23, October.

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