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The importance of social and government learning in ex ante policy evaluation

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  • Castañeda, Gonzalo
  • Guerrero, Omar A.

Abstract

We provide two methodological insights on ex ante policy evaluation for macro models of economic development. First, we show that the problems of parameter instability and lack of behavioral constancy can be overcome by considering learning dynamics. Hence, instead of defining social constructs as fixed exogenous parameters, we represent them through stable functional relationships such as social norms. Second, we demonstrate how agent computing can be used for this purpose. By deploying a model of policy prioritization with endogenous government behavior, we estimate the performance of different policy regimes. We find that, while strictly adhering to policy recommendations increases efficiency, the nature of such recipes has a bigger effect. In other words, while it is true that lack of discipline is detrimental to prescription outcomes (a common defense of failed recommendations), it is more important that such prescriptions consider the systemic and adaptive nature of the policymaking process (something neglected by traditional technocratic advice).

Suggested Citation

  • Castañeda, Gonzalo & Guerrero, Omar A., 2019. "The importance of social and government learning in ex ante policy evaluation," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 273-293.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:41:y:2019:i:2:p:273-293
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.01.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Castañeda, Gonzalo & Chávez-Juárez, Florian & Guerrero, Omar A., 2018. "How do governments determine policy priorities? Studying development strategies through spillover networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 335-361.
    5. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    6. Gräbner, Claudius, 2015. "Methodology Does Matter: About Implicit Assumptions in Applied Formal Modelling. The case of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models vs Agent-Based Models," MPRA Paper 63003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. A. Davola & I. Querci & S. Romani, 2023. "No Consumer Is an Island—Relational Disclosure as a Regulatory Strategy to Advance Consumer Protection Against Microtargeting," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-25, March.
    2. Guerrero, Omar A. & Guariso, Daniele & Castañeda, Gonzalo, 2023. "Aid effectiveness in sustainable development: A multidimensional approach," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    3. Guerrero, Omar A. & Castañeda, Gonzalo & Trujillo, Georgina & Hackett, Lucy & Chávez-Juárez, Florian, 2022. "Subnational sustainable development: The role of vertical intergovernmental transfers in reaching multidimensional goals," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    4. Alfano, Vincenzo & Ercolano, Salvatore & Pinto, Mauro, 2022. "Fighting the COVID pandemic: National policy choices in non-pharmaceutical interventions," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 22-40.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy evaluation; Development economics; Corruption; Agent-based model; Sustainable development goals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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