Modeling external constraints on the hegemonic strategies of regional powers
A simple general equilibrium model is borrowed from economics to study alternative foreign policy strategies of regional powers that are conditional on external constraints. An equilibrium hegemonic strategy is modeled as the joint production and consumption of two “goods” (empire and leadership) that are produced with two “input factors” (political repression and political support). A persistent policy change on the part of a global-level actor, such as a shift in great power interference, leads to a change in the hegemonic strategy of the regional power and to a disequilibrium. It is shown that an equilibrium can only be restored by a corresponding persistent change in the level of state power. Economic performance is identified as a key determinant of state power.
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