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Cooperative Authoritarians and Regime Stability

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  • Fuller Clay Robert

    (Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, Gambrell Hall, Columbia, SC 29208-0001, USA)

Abstract

This article assumes that the post-cold war unipolar global power structure marked the beginnings of a two-level game of national survival involving an international process of “othering,” where the winning democracies and their leaders (the “West”) view many non-democracies and their leaders as threats that they must convert, subjugate, or eradicate. Using new data on special economic zones (SEZs), I find that geographically restricting economic liberalization and reducing competition from opposition parties increases authoritarian stability and durability in this new environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuller Clay Robert, 2017. "Cooperative Authoritarians and Regime Stability," New Global Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:nglost:v:11:y:2017:i:1:p:1-28:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ngs-2017-0009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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