Determinants of high-royalty contracts and the impact of stronger protection of intellectual property rights in Japan
This paper first reviews how Japan has strengthened the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), focusing on the expansion of the patentable subject matter, the restriction of the possibility of compulsory licensing, stronger deterrence against infringement and the introduction of the doctrine of equivalents. Second, based on the statistical analysis of sector-level panel data, it shows that (1)R&D intensity of domestic industry, trademark licensing, cross-licensing and, to a smaller degree, monopoly provisions are the significant determinants of the incidence of high-royalty contracts, and (2)Stronger protection of intellectual property rights looks to have increased the incidence of high-royalty contracts in the latter part of 1990s in the Japanese industries for which patent is important for appropriability.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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