IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v69y2003i1p227-258.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Espen Eckbo, B.
  • Thorburn, Karin S.

Abstract

We argue that the existence of CEO private control benefits complements managerial reputation in counteracting costly shareholder risk-shifting incentives during severe financial distress, when job-loss may be imminent. We examine this argument empirically using bankruptcy filings in Sweden, where a filing automatically terminates CEO employment and requires the firm to be sold in an open auction. The median CEO income loss is a dramatic 40%, suggesting that bankruptcy filing damages CEO reputation. Empirical proxies for both CEO reputation and control benefits are significant determinants of the probability of the CEO being rehired by the buyer in the auction, as predicted. Moreover, we find that the rehired CEOs generate a post-bankruptcy accounting performance at par with industry rivals. The surprisingly strong survival characteristics of the reorganized firms are consistent with managerial conservatism ex ante, and help alleviate creditor concern with costly asset substitution designed to delay filing in an automatic bankruptcy auction system.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Espen Eckbo, B. & Thorburn, Karin S., 2003. "Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 227-258, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:69:y:2003:i:1:p:227-258
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-405X(03)00126-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, Restructuring, pages 215-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Comment, Robert & Schwert, G. William, 1995. "Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 3-43, September.
    3. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
    4. Espen Eckbo, B. & Verma, Savita, 1994. "Managerial shareownership, voting power, and cash dividend policy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 33-62, March.
    5. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
    6. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    7. Hirshleifer, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. "Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 437-470.
    8. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda & Wruck, Karen H., 2002. "Asset liquidity, debt covenants, and managerial discretion in financial distress:*1: the collapse of L.A. Gear," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 3-34, April.
    9. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    11. Brander, J.A. & Poitevin, M., 1988. "Managerial Compensation And The Agency Costs Of Debt Finance," Cahiers de recherche 8827, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    12. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-148.
    13. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 842-852, September.
    14. Gilson, Stuart C., 1990. "Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders : Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 355-387, October.
    15. Brickley, James A. & Linck, James S. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1999. "What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 341-377, June.
    16. Per Strömberg, 2000. "Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2641-2692, December.
    17. Betker, Brian L, 1995. "Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 161-183, April.
    18. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    19. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    20. Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
    21. Ofek, Eli, 1993. "Capital structure and firm response to poor performance: An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 3-30, August.
    22. John, Kose & Ofek, Eli, 1995. "Asset sales and increase in focus," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 105-126, January.
    23. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    24. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    25. Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March.
    26. Murphy, Kevin J. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 1993. "Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 273-315, April.
    27. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
    28. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:5:p:1443-1493 is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Lease, Ronald C. & McConnell, John J. & Mikkelson, Wayne H., 1983. "The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 439-471, April.
    30. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1997. "The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 205-228, May.
    31. repec:cep:stitep:/1992/250 is not listed on IDEAS
    32. Goyal, Vidhan K. & Park, Chul W., 2002. "Board leadership structure and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66, January.
    33. John, Kose & Lang, Larry H P & Netter, Jeffry, 1992. "The Voluntary Restructuring of Large Firms in Response to Performance Decline," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 891-917, July.
    34. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563, Elsevier.
    35. Oliver Hart, 2000. "Different Approaches to Bankruptcy," NBER Working Papers 7921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    36. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February.
    37. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K., 1994. "Majority owner-managers and organizational efficiency," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 91-118, March.
    38. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:3:p:939-978 is not listed on IDEAS
    39. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    40. Thorburn, Karin S., 2000. "Bankruptcy auctions: costs, debt recovery, and firm survival," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 337-368, December.
    41. Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(4), pages 835-860.
    42. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:5:p:1495-1532 is not listed on IDEAS
    43. Eckbo, B Espen & Thorburn, Karin S, 2002. "Overbidding versus Fire-Sales in Bankruptcy Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    44. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    2. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Other publications TiSEM aee04553-20a7-475a-96e1-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Narayanan Subramanian & Atreya Chakraborty & Shahbaz Sheikh, 2002. "Performance Incentives, Performance Pressure and Executive Turnover," Finance 0210003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Oct 2002.
    4. Alexander Radygin & Revold Entov & Marina Turuntseva & Alena Gontmakher & Harry Swain & Jeff Carruthers & Karen Minden & Cheryl Urban, 2002. "The problems of corporate governance in Russia and its regions," Published Papers 12, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2002.
    5. Peter Cziraki & Moqi Xu, 2014. "Ceo Job Security And Risk-Taking," FMG Discussion Papers dp729, Financial Markets Group.
    6. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, 2009. "Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 21(3), pages 38-52, June.
    8. Nadide BANU OLCAY GÜNER, 2023. "Incentivizing CEOs via pay and forced turnover: Do tenure and managerial ability matter?," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(1(634), S), pages 37-66, Spring.
    9. Elisabeth Dedman, 2003. "Executive turnover in UK firms: the impact of Cadbury," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 33-50.
    10. Denis, David J. & Kruse, Timothy A., 2000. "Managerial discipline and corporate restructuring following performance declines," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 391-424, March.
    11. Weisbach, Michael S., 1995. "CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 159-188, February.
    12. Cziraki, Peter & Xu, Moqi, 2014. "CEO job security and risk-taking," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55909, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Berezinets Irina & Ilina Yulia & Muravyev Alexander, 2011. "Owners, Boards, Managers and the Private Benefits of Control: A Study of Dual Class Stock Firms in an Emerging Market," EERC Working Paper Series 11/12e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    14. Nenova, Tatiana, 2006. "Takeover laws and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4029, The World Bank.
    15. John, Kose & Ravid, S. Abraham & Sunder, Jayanthi, 2017. "Managerial ability and success: Evidence from the career paths of film directors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 425-439.
    16. Jian, Ming & Lee, Kin Wai, 2011. "Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 929-946, September.
    17. Citci, Sadettin Haluk & Inci, Eren, 2016. "The masquerade ball of the CEOs and the mask of excessive risk," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 383-393.
    18. Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2015. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2155-2184, October.
    19. Brickley, James A. & Linck, James S. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1999. "What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 341-377, June.
    20. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    21. Martin Conyon & Annita Florou, 2002. "Top executive dismissal, ownership and corporate performance," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 209-225.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:69:y:2003:i:1:p:227-258. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.