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Shareholder nonparticipation in valuable rights offerings: New findings for an old puzzle

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  • Holderness, Clifford G.
  • Pontiff, Jeffrey

Abstract

Shareholder participation in valuable domestic rights offerings averages only 64%, which is considerably lower than previously asserted. This causes wealth transfers from nonparticipating to participating shareholders that average 7% of the offering. Wealth transfers are larger in nontransferable and bigger offerings. The stock market reacts more negatively to larger wealth transfers. Offerings with lower shareholder participation also fall short in raising publicly stated capital goals. Rights offerings are far more common in countries with institutional practices that limit nonparticipating shareholders’ wealth losses. These findings suggest that agency conflicts influence the use of rights offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Holderness, Clifford G. & Pontiff, Jeffrey, 2016. "Shareholder nonparticipation in valuable rights offerings: New findings for an old puzzle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 252-268.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:120:y:2016:i:2:p:252-268
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Groen-Xu, Moqi & Massa, Massimo & Mataigne, Virginie & Vermaelen, Theo, 2017. "Choices in Equity Finance A Global Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11987, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rights offerings; Agency costs; Wealth transfers;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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