Managing no-shows in public resource allocation: The economics of campground reservations

Low prices, limited capacity and increased interest in outdoor recreation contribute to intense competition for public campsites in the United States. Yet, users and park managers report high vacancy rates due to unused reservations or “no-shows.” I develop a simple model for the campground reservation, cancellation and no-show decisions. I numerically simulate pricing policies at a hypothetical but representative park. When capacity constraints are binding, the cancellation fees charged by many parks increase no-shows and decrease consumer surplus. In contrast, modestly higher prices and no-show fees dramatically reduce no-shows and increase social surplus by 8 to 15 percent. However, these policies create different distributional effects. Higher prices raise revenue but decrease consumer surplus and discourage reservations from lower income users when income is positively correlated with trip utility. No-show fees increase consumer surplus and do not materially affect the income distribution of users. The optimal no-show fee, equal to the lost consumer surplus from the marginal no-show, maximizes consumer surplus and increases social surplus by 8.5 percent.