IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jaerec/doi10.1086-676451.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Harvest Allocation without Property Rights

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Holzer
  • Kenneth McConnell

Abstract

Resources are often allocated without property rights and the attendant market exchanges. Households commonly encounter these situations--access to schools, on-street parking. Fishing firms typically exploit stocks in a limited-entry setting under input controls. Absent transferable rights and the sorting of marginal values induced by price mechanisms, it is critical to understand the rules governing access. We study allocation of harvest among fishing sectors in this second-best context and demonstrate that optimal allocation combines information on probabilities of access with the standard information in marginal value schedules. We illustrate our arguments with data from the Gulf of Maine.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Holzer & Kenneth McConnell, 2014. "Harvest Allocation without Property Rights," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 209-232.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jaerec:doi:10.1086/676451
    DOI: 10.1086/676451
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676451
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676451
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1987. "Suboptimal Controls in Common Resource Management: The Case of the Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 179-194, February.
    2. Joseph Seneca, 1970. "The welfare effects of zero pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 101-110, March.
    3. Evans, Mary F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Flores, Nicholas E., 2009. "Hybrid allocation mechanisms for publicly provided goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 311-325, February.
    4. Mumy, Gene E & Hanke, Steve H, 1975. "Public Investment Criteria for Underpriced Public Products," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 712-720, September.
    5. Taylor, Grant A. & Tsui, Kevin K. K. & Zhu, Lijing, 2003. "Lottery or waiting-line auction?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1313-1334, May.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
    7. Boyce, John R, 1994. "Allocation of Goods by Lottery," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(3), pages 457-476, July.
    8. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Efficient vs open-access use of public facilities in the long run," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 462-469, December.
    9. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jaerec:doi:10.1086/676451. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JAERE .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.