IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbrese/v62y2009i11p1200-1206.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Yenn-Ru
  • Chuang, Wei-Ting

Abstract

This study contends that the association between corporate cash holdings and corporate governance is subject to the investment environments that firms face. For example, firms with an abundance of investment opportunities have a strong incentive to hold cash in order to maintain their competitive positions. Shareholders accept high levels of cash holdings in such growing firms if corporate governance can protect their interests. This study examines the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings for a sample of high-tech firms. The results show that CEO ownership, the directorship of venture capitalists (VCs), and independent directors play critical roles in corporate cash policy. In addition, the boards are more effective when the firms' CEOs are also their founders or when VCs hold a large stake of company shares. The effects of corporate governance are more significant in younger firms while the effects of firm-specific economic variables are more significant in older firms in the sample.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Yenn-Ru & Chuang, Wei-Ting, 2009. "Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(11), pages 1200-1206, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:62:y:2009:i:11:p:1200-1206
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148-2963(08)00139-2
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dittmar, Amy & Mahrt-Smith, Jan & Servaes, Henri, 2003. "International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 111-133, March.
    2. L.A.A. Van den Berghe & Abigail Levrau, 2002. "The Role of the Venture Capitalist as Monitor of the Company: a corporate governance perspective," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 124-135, July.
    3. Ozkan, Aydin & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2004. "Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 2103-2134, September.
    4. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox of Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 733-771.
    5. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    6. Bushman, Robert & Chen, Qi & Engel, Ellen & Smith, Abbie, 2004. "Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 167-201, June.
    7. Opler, Tim & Pinkowitz, Lee & Stulz, Rene & Williamson, Rohan, 1999. "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 3-46, April.
    8. Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2000. "The Interaction between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(4), pages 959-984.
    9. Glenn W. Boyle & Graeme A. Guthrie, 2003. "Investment, Uncertainty, and Liquidity," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2143-2166, October.
    10. Robert E. Carpenter & Bruce C. Petersen, 2002. "Capital Market Imperfections, High-Tech Investment, and New Equity Financing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 54-72, February.
    11. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    12. Guiso, Luigi, 1998. "High-tech firms and credit rationing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 39-59, March.
    13. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 2003. "Do Persistent Large Cash Reserves Hinder Performance?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 275-294, June.
    14. Fried, Vance H. & Bruton, Garry D. & Hisrich, Robert D., 1998. "Strategy and the board of directors in venture capital-backed firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 493-503, November.
    15. Mason A. Carpenter & Timothy G. Pollock & Myleen M. Leary, 2003. "Testing a model of reasoned risk‐taking: governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in high‐technology IPO firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9), pages 803-820, September.
    16. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    17. Noam Wasserman, 2003. "Founder-CEO Succession and the Paradox of Entrepreneurial Success," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(2), pages 149-172, April.
    18. Kim, Chang-Soo & Mauer, David C. & Sherman, Ann E., 1998. "The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 335-359, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yenn‐Ru Chen, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Listed New Economy versus Old Economy Firms," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 430-442, September.
    2. Tahir Akhtar & Mohammad Ali Tareq & Kashif Rashid, 2021. "Chief Executive Officers’ monitoring, board effectiveness, managerial ownership, and cash holdings: evidence from ASEAN," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(8), pages 2193-2238, November.
    3. Anderson, Ronald W. & Hamadi, Malika, 2016. "Cash holding and control-oriented finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 410-425.
    4. Farinha, Jorge & Mateus, Cesario & Soares, Nuno, 2018. "Cash holdings and earnings quality: evidence from the Main and Alternative UK markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 238-252.
    5. Ming-Chi Chen & Chin-Yu Wang & So-De Shyu, 2012. "Liquidity and the Future Stock Returns of the REIT Industry," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 588-603, October.
    6. Pascal Nguyen & Nahid Rahman, 2020. "Institutional ownership, cross‐shareholdings and corporate cash reserves in Japan," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 1175-1207, April.
    7. Anderson, Ronald W. & Hamadi, Malika, 2016. "Cash holding and control-oriented finance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68339, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Marc B.J. Schauten & Dick van Dijk & Jan†Paul van der Waal, 2013. "Corporate Governance and the Value of Excess Cash Holdings of Large European Firms," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 19(5), pages 991-1016, November.
    9. Dittmar, Amy & Mahrt-Smith, Jan, 2007. "Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 599-634, March.
    10. Gary E. Powell & H. Kent Baker, 2010. "Management Views on Corporate Cash Holdings," Discussion Paper Series 2010-01, McColl School of Business, Queens University of Charlotte.
    11. Eloisa Perez-de Toledo & Evandro Bocatto, 2013. "Quality of Governance and the Market Value of Cash: Evidence from Spain," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 7(2), pages 91-104.
    12. Elena Smirnova & Sirousse Tabriztchi & Cary Lange, 2015. "Cash Holdings, Use of Debt and Dividend Structure of Family Firms," American Journal of Economics and Business Administration, Science Publications, vol. 7(1), pages 1-10, May.
    13. Yao, Youfu & Hong, Yun, 2023. "Can comment letters impact excess cash holdings? Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 900-922.
    14. Bigelli, Marco & Sánchez-Vidal, Javier, 2012. "Cash holdings in private firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 26-35.
    15. Huang, Winifred & Mazouz, Khelifa, 2018. "Excess cash, trading continuity, and liquidity risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 275-291.
    16. Tran, Quoc Trung, 2020. "Financial crisis, shareholder protection and cash holdings," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    17. Jose Miranda-Lopez & Svetlana Orlova & Li Sun, 2019. "CEO network centrality and corporate cash holdings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 967-1003, November.
    18. Dobetz, Wolfgang & Grüninger, Matthias C., 2006. "Corporate cash holdings: Evidence from a different institutional setting," Working papers 2006/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    19. Acharya, Viral V. & Almeida, Heitor & Campello, Murillo, 2007. "Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 515-554, October.
    20. Xin Chen & Chang Yang, 2021. "Vertical interlock and the value of cash holdings," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(1), pages 561-593, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:62:y:2009:i:11:p:1200-1206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.