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Does maker-taker limit order subsidy improve market outcomes? Quasi-natural experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Lin, Yiping
  • Swan, Peter L.
  • Harris, Frederick H.de B.

Abstract

We provide a new theory of exchange access fees that explains why fees relatively reduce the probability of execution and increase the limit order queue length on “maker-taker” platforms. Nonetheless, the limit order subsidy greatly improves market depth, together with market efficiency and trading volume. Moreover, fee structures never “wash out” regardless of the minimum tick. The regulatory requirement that trading and order flow depend only on raw (nominal) spreads and prices underpins the multi-billion-dollar subsidy to limit orders. So long as a platform remains competitive, elimination of the fee structure does not alter the raw spread, but it does lower the cum fee spread. We test these implications with a unilateral maker-taker fee/rebate reduction using NASDAQ's “quasi-natural” $1.9 trillion experiment to find support for our theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Lin, Yiping & Swan, Peter L. & Harris, Frederick H.de B., 2025. "Does maker-taker limit order subsidy improve market outcomes? Quasi-natural experimental evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:170:y:2025:i:c:s0378426624002449
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107330
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Maker-taker fee; Limit order subsidy; RegNMS; Fee pilot; Best execution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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