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Pashtunwali—Law for the lawless, defense for the stateless

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  • Benson, Bruce L.
  • Siddiqui, Zafar R.

Abstract

Despite a large and growing literature on systems of law without coercive central authority, the overwhelmingly dominant view remains that law, as a public good, must be produced by the state. Defense against attempts to subjugate a community is even more widely viewed as a public good and therefore a necessary function of the state. This case study of the Pashtunwali – the customary law followed by the ethnic Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan – illustrates that both law and community defense can be effectively produced without the institutions of a state. The incentives created under Pashtunwali have provided the Pashtun with a decentralized system for maintaining order within and between the tribes for several centuries without the authority of a coercive state. In addition, they have generated a system of spontaneous decentralized defense that has allowed the Pashtun to retain/regain their independence from the states that have tried to colonize or subjugate them for centuries.

Suggested Citation

  • Benson, Bruce L. & Siddiqui, Zafar R., 2014. "Pashtunwali—Law for the lawless, defense for the stateless," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 108-120.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:108-120
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2013.07.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Geloso & Peter T. Leeson, 2020. "Are Anarcho-Capitalists Insane? Medieval Icelandic Conflict Institutions in Comparative Perspective," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 957-974.
    2. Salma Hamza & Imran Khan & Linlin Lu & Hua Liu & Farkhunda Burke & Syed Nawaz-ul-Huda & Muhammad Fahad Baqa & Aqil Tariq, 2021. "The Relationship between Neighborhood Characteristics and Homicide in Karachi, Pakistan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(10), pages 1-14, May.
    3. Farooq Yousaf, 2019. "Pakistan’s “Tribal†Pashtuns, Their “Violent†Representation, and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(1), pages 21582440198, February.
    4. Perry Ferrell, 2019. "Titles for me but not for thee: transitional gains trap of property rights extension in Colombia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 95-114, January.

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