Income redistribution and criminality in a growing economy
We examine the question of whether a combination of law enforcement and redistributive transfers will be used in fighting criminality due to poverty. This is done in a model where a proportion of the poor participates in illegal activities. The victims of theft are firms. In contrast to most of the literature, we add a dynamic aspect: Technological progress leads to a permanent increase in labor productivities and firm output. We show that transfers will be used to fight criminality only after a certain level of economic development has been reached.
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