Standardization policy and international trade
In this paper we examine the incentives for governments to recognize the standards of foreign products. In the case of non-recognition, a foreign firm must incur an additional cost to sell in the local market.
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- Jensen, Richard & Thursby, Marie, 1996.
"Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(1), pages 21-49, February.
- Richard A. Jensen & Marie Thursby, 1991. "Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition," NBER Working Papers 3870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jensen, R. & Thursby, M., 1994. "Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition," Papers 94-015, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
- Boom, Anette, 1995. "Asymmetric International Minimum Quality Standards and Vertical Differentiation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 101-119, March.
- Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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