Potential pitfalls in empirical investigations of the effects of incentive regulation plans in the telecommunications industry
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- Kridel, Donald J & Sappington, David E M & Weisman, Dennis L, 1996. "The Effects of Incentive Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 269-306, May.
- Weisman, Dennis L, 1994. "Why Less May Be More under Price-Cap Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 339-61, December.
- M.E. Beesley & S.C. Littlechild, 1989. "The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 454-472, Autumn.
- Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:8:y:1996:i:2:p:125-140. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
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