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Numbers to the people: regulation, ownership and local number portability

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  • Gans, Joshua S.
  • King, Stephen P.
  • Woodbridge, Graeme

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  • Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P. & Woodbridge, Graeme, 2001. "Numbers to the people: regulation, ownership and local number portability," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 167-180, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:167-180
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447, Elsevier.
    2. Reinke, Thomas H, 1998. "Local number portability and local loop competition. Critical issues," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 73-87, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse, Hans & Provoost, Thomas, 2010. "Enhancing market power by reducing switching costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 131-133, November.
    2. Mueller, Milton L. & Park, Yuri & Lee, Jongsu & Kim, Tai-Yoo, 2006. "Digital identity: How users value the attributes of online identifiers," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 405-422, November.
    3. Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, 2004. "Mobile Number Portability," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 223-238, September.
    4. Andrés Chambouleyron, 2003. "An Incentive Mechanism for Decentralized Water Metering Decisions," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 17(2), pages 89-111, April.
    5. Solomon A. Keelson & Addo J. Odei, 2014. "Relationship Between Mobile Number Portability And Consumer Choice Of Active Multiple Mobile Phone Numbers In Ghana," Global Journal of Business Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 8(4), pages 99-110.
    6. Marcio Iorio Aranha, 2016. "Telecommunications Regulatory Design in Brazil: Networking around State Capacity Deficits," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(2), pages 83-105.
    7. Suraj Kushe Shekhar, 2015. "Mobile Number Portability and Consumer Behaviour: A Study with Reference to Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, India," Hyperion Economic Journal, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Hyperion University of Bucharest, Romania, vol. 3(3), pages 19-23, September.
    8. Lee, Jongsu & Kim, Yeonbae & Lee, Jeong-Dong & Park, Yuri, 2006. "Estimating the extent of potential competition in the Korean mobile telecommunications market: Switching costs and number portability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-124, January.
    9. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King & Julian Wright, 2005. "Wireless Communications," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-45, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    10. Justus Haucap, 2003. "Telephone Number Allocation: A Property Rights Approach," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 91-109, March.
    11. Sean Lyons, 2006. "Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability," Trinity Economics Papers tep2009, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.

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