Insider trading activity, tenure length, and managerial compensation
In this study, insider trading activity is used as part of a managerial compensation structure. The wage structure changes with the tenure duration of the insider. Managers with shorter tenure rely more on insider profits as part of their compensation. On the other hand, managers with longer tenure execute insider transactions with lower profits. Different measurements of insider profits using calendar day returns of insider transactions, holding period returns for different horizons, or weighted average cumulative abnormal returns for the executive all lead to the same conclusion. The results are robust to various well-known empirical models, such as the CAPM model, the Fama and French (1993) three factor model, or the Carhart (1997) four factor model. Insider trading profits have increased in recent years overall, especially after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implementation of Rule 10b5-1 in 2000. Therefore, the design of a wage schedule incorporating insider trading activity has become more relevant.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
- Darren T. Roulstone, 2003. "The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 525-551, 06.
- George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Insider Information and Performance Pay," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(3-4), pages 515-541.
- Jenter, Dirk, 2004.
"Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk,"
4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- AC Pritchard, 2007. "Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 627-652, October.
- Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977.
"Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May.
- Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle., 1976. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Research Program in Finance Working Papers 41, University of California at Berkeley.
- Low, Angie, 2009. "Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 470-490, June.
- Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 2002. "Effects of insider trading under different market structures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-39.
- Jaffe, Jeffrey F, 1974. "Special Information and Insider Trading," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(3), pages 410-28, July.
- Finnerty, Joseph E, 1976. "Insiders and Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1141-48, September.
- Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
- A. Can Inci & Biao Lu & H. Nejat Seyhun, 2010. "Intraday Behavior of Stock Prices and Trades around Insider Trading," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 323-363, 03.
- Rahi Rohit, 1995. "Optimal Incomplete Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 171-197, February.
- Robert M. Bushman & Joseph D. Piotroski & Abbie J. Smith, 2005. "Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 35-66, 02.
- Stephen A. Ross, 2004. "Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 207-225, 02.
- Hayne E. Leland., 1990.
"Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?,"
Research Program in Finance Working Papers
RPF-195, University of California at Berkeley.
- Seyhun, H. Nejat, 1986. "Insiders' profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 189-212, June.
- Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1993. "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-56, February.
- Leonard J. Mirman & Neelam Jain, 2000. "Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 333-353.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, July.
- Debraj Ray, 2002. "The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 547-582, March.
- Seyhun, H Nejat, 1992. "The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 149-82, April.
- Lakonishok, Josef & Lee, Inmoo, 2001. "Are Insider Trades Informative?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(1), pages 79-111.
- Rozeff, Michael S & Zaman, Mir A, 1988. "Market Efficiency and Insider Trading: New Evidence," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 25-44, January.
- H. Nejat Seyhun, 1992. "Why Does Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1303-1331.
- John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, 2003. "Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 27-50.
- Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1995. "Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 557-575.
- Bruno Biais & Laurent Germain, 2002. "Incentive-Compatible Contracts for the Sale of Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 987-1003.
- Bradford, William D, 1987. " The Issue Decision of Manager-Owners under Information Asymmetry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(5), pages 1245-60, December.
- Carhart, Mark M, 1997. " On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
- Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
- Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1988. "Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 541-554.
- Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-99, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:23:y:2012:i:3:p:151-166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.