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Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives




ABSTRACT This study examines whether managers strategically alter disclosure "quality" in response to personal incentives, specifically those derived from trading on their own account. Using changes in market liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, I find that trading incentives are associated with disclosure quality choices. Tests are performed across three disclosure samples: management forecasts, conference calls, and press releases. Consistent with a desire to reduce the probability of litigation, I find evidence that managers provide "higher quality" disclosures before selling shares than they provide in the absence of trading. Consistent with a desire to maintain their information advantage, I find some, albeit weaker, evidence that managers provide "lower quality" disclosures prior to purchasing shares than they provide in the absence of trading. Copyright (c), University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2008.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan L. Rogers, 2008. "Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(5), pages 1265-1296, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:46:y:2008:i:5:p:1265-1296

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    Cited by:

    1. Fei Leng & Kevin Zhao, 2014. "Insider trading around open-market share repurchases," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 38(3), pages 461-491, July.
    2. Julia Sawicki & Keshab Shrestha, 2014. "Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(7-8), pages 926-949, September.
    3. Ertimur, Yonca & Sletten, Ewa & Sunder, Jayanthi, 2014. "Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: Evidence from IPO lockup expirations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 79-95.
    4. Ball, Ray & Jayaraman, Sudarshan & Shivakumar, Lakshmanan, 2012. "Audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure as complements: A test of the Confirmation Hypothesis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 136-166.
    5. Jonathan L. Rogers & Douglas J. Skinner & Sarah L. C. Zechman, 2016. "The role of the media in disseminating insider-trading news," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 711-739, September.
    6. Rogers, Jonathan L. & Skinner, Douglas J. & Van Buskirk, Andrew, 2009. "Earnings guidance and market uncertainty," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 90-109, October.
    7. Dai, Lili & Fu, Renhui & Kang, Jun-Koo & Lee, Inmoo, 2016. "Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 235-253.
    8. repec:eee:jfinec:v:125:y:2017:i:1:p:143-162 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Berger, Philip G., 2011. "Challenges and opportunities in disclosure research—A discussion of ‘the financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature’," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 204-218.
    10. Rogers, Jonathan L. & Van Buskirk, Andrew, 2009. "Shareholder litigation and changes in disclosure behavior," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1-2), pages 136-156, March.
    11. Rogers, Jonathan L. & Van Buskirk, Andrew, 2013. "Bundled forecasts in empirical accounting research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 43-65.
    12. repec:eee:advacc:v:30:y:2014:i:2:p:276-282 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Skaife, Hollis A. & Veenman, David & Wangerin, Daniel, 2013. "Internal control over financial reporting and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 91-110.
    14. Kenneth Froot & Namho Kang & Gideon Ozik & Ronnie Sadka, 2016. "What Do Measures of Real-time Corporate Sales Tell Us about Earnings Surprises and Post-Announcement Returns?," NBER Working Papers 22366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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