IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v15y2002i4p987-1003.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Incentive-Compatible Contracts for the Sale of Information

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Biais
  • Laurent Germain

Abstract

An informed financial institution can trade on private information and also sell it to clients through a managed fund. To provide an incentive for the informed agent to trade in the interest of her client, the optimal contract requires that she be compensated as an increasing function of the profits of the fund. The optimal contract is also designed to limit the aggressiveness of the sum of the fund's trade and the proprietary trade. This reduces information revelation and thus leads to greater overall trading profits than if the informed agent only conducted proprietary trades. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Biais & Laurent Germain, 2002. "Incentive-Compatible Contracts for the Sale of Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 987-1003.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:15:y:2002:i:4:p:987-1003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Edelen, Roger M. & Evans, Richard B. & Kadlec, Gregory B., 2012. "Disclosure and agency conflict: Evidence from mutual fund commission bundling," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 308-326.
    2. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2007. "Stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 768-785, September.
    3. Biais, Bruno & Glosten, Larry & Spatt, Chester, 2005. "Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 217-264, May.
    4. Frey, Stefan & Herbst, Patrick, 2014. "The influence of buy-side analysts on mutual fund trading," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 442-458.
    5. Dev, Pritha, 2013. "Transfer of information by an informed trader," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 58-71.
    6. Chen, Zhaohui & Wilhelm Jr, William J, 2005. "The Industrial Organization of Financial Market Information Production," CEPR Discussion Papers 5314, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Inci, A. Can, 2012. "Insider trading activity, tenure length, and managerial compensation," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 151-166.
    8. Germain, Laurent, 2005. "Strategic noise in competitive markets for the sale of information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 179-209, April.
    9. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2004. "Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Precise Information in Delegated Portfolio Management," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 25(1), pages 25-36, February.
    10. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2005. "Stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account," CORE Discussion Papers 2005089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. García, Diego & Vanden, Joel M., 2009. "Information acquisition and mutual funds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1965-1995, September.
    12. Joanne K. Yoong & Angela Hung, 2009. "Self-Dealing and Compensation for Financial Advisors," Working Papers 713, RAND Corporation.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:15:y:2002:i:4:p:987-1003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.