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Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity

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  • Berger, Ulrich

Abstract

Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others' previous reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature. Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Berger, Ulrich, 2011. "Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 30-37, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:30-37
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
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    3. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    4. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
    5. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    6. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1457-1468, August.
    7. Seinen, Ingrid & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 581-602, April.
    8. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:grdene:v:23:y:2014:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-013-9341-y is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Berger, Ulrich & Grüne, Ansgar, 2016. "On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 19-33.
    3. Berger, Ulrich & Grüne, Ansgar, 2014. "Evolutionary Stability of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 4087, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    4. Berger Ulrich & Ansgar Grüne, 2014. "Evolutionary Stability of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp168, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Jason Olejarz & Whan Ghang & Martin A. Nowak, 2015. "Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-20, September.

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